Spatial Econometric Analysis of the Effect of Government Governance on Regional Emission Reduction: Evidence from China
Yuanhua Yang 1  
Guohua Niu 2  
Dengli Tang 3  
Mengjue Zhu 1  
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School of Public Management, Guangdong University of Finance and Economics,Guangzhou, China
Personnel Education Department, Foshan Municipal Local Taxation Bureau, Foshan, China
School of Business Administration, Guangdong University of Finance and Economics, Guangzhou, China
Online publish date: 2018-06-25
Publish date: 2018-07-09
Submission date: 2017-07-29
Final revision date: 2017-11-03
Acceptance date: 2017-11-21
Pol. J. Environ. Stud. 2018;27(6):2833–2842
This paper analyzes the spatial distribution characteristics of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions in 30 Chinese provinces from 2002 to 2013, and systematically examines the relationship between government and CO2 emissions from the level of regional legal regulation, the level of public expenditure, and corruption. Research results show that the global Moran’s I values of carbon emissions from 2002 to 2013 falls between 0.2 and 0.3, and spatial lag coefficient ρ stands at 0.2340, indicating that CO2 emissions in the region increase by 0.234% for each additional 1% of CO2 emissions in the adjacent areas, which means carbon emissions exist in a remarkable spatial autocorrelation and spatial clustering phenomenon. Then the empirical results find that the level of legal regulation and the level of regional corruption are significantly negatively correlated with regional CO2 emissions, while the level of public expenditure is significantly positively correlated with regional CO2 emissions. The results also demonstrate the inverted “U”-shaped relationship between economic income and CO2 emissions. Based on empirical results, this paper provides beneficial policy recommendations for reducing carbon emissions.
Yuanhua Yang   
Guangdong University of Finance and Economics, 21 Luntou Road, Haizhu District, Guangzhou City, Guangdong Province, 510320 Guangzhou, China