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ORIGINAL RESEARCH
Does the Chinese Government’s System
of Rewards and Punishments Encourage Farmers
to Use Green Agricultural Technologies? Analysis
Based on Three-Party Evolutionary Game
1
College of Economics and Management, Hebei Agricultural University, No. 2596 South Lacey Avenue,
Baoding 071000, Hebei province,China
Submission date: 2023-12-27
Final revision date: 2024-03-18
Acceptance date: 2024-04-13
Online publication date: 2024-06-06
Publication date: 2025-01-09
Corresponding author
Yan Gao
College of Economics and Management, Hebei Agricultural University, No. 2596 South Lacey Avenue, Baoding 071000, Hebei province,China
College of Economics and Management, Hebei Agricultural University, No. 2596 South Lacey Avenue, Baoding 071000, Hebei province,China
Pol. J. Environ. Stud. 2025;34(2):1039-1055
KEYWORDS
Green technology adoptiongovernment actionconsumer willingnesstripartite evolutionary gamesimulation analysis
TOPICS
ABSTRACT
Increasing farmers’ willingness to adopt green technologies is an important precondition for driving
agricultural modes of production to adjust and achieve green development in agriculture. However,
their willingness to adopt green technologies is influenced by their own government and consumer
behavior. Based on the assumption of bounded rationality, this paper constructs a dynamic evolutionary
game model among farmers, government, and consumers and analyzes the optimal stability strategy.
The influence of the change in adoption intention from weak to strong on the choice of optima
government behavior is investigated by numerical simulation. The results show that there is
an evolutionarily stable strategy combination (farmer adoption, government intervention, consumer
purchase) under the premise of controlling the government subsidy. The effect of consumers’ willingness
to consume on farmers’ green adoption is greater than that of the government’s intervention. The larger
the proportion for farmers’ green income distribution, the higher the enthusiasm for farmers’ green
production. Government subsidies are more suitable for low-willing farmers. When the willingness
of farmers increases, the role of government fines becomes greater than subsidies. Therefore,
the government should strengthen the quality supervision and publicity of green products, set up
a service platform to smooth the channels of production and marketing, and at the same time make
appropriate use of subsidies, fines, and other policies.
CONFLICT OF INTEREST
The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.
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